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Is an independent Scottish 
electricity system good for 
renewable energy and Scotland? 
 
The DREUD Report on implications of the UK Government’s 
decisions on new nuclear power and Electricity Market Reform 
for the prospects of renewable energy in Scotland. 
 
By David Toke, Peter Strachan, Richard Cowell,  
Geraint Ellis, and Fionnguala Sherry-Brennan.
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Delivering Renewable 
Energy Under Devolution 
(DREUD) is a project funded 
by the ESRC in the 2011-
2013 period conducted by 
Cardiff University, University 
of Birmingham, Queens 
University Belfast and Robert 
Gordon University. This 
report extends the work of 
this project.  
 
Note: Dr Toke who worked on the project 
based at the University of Birmingham is 
now based at the University of Aberdeen.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
At the beginning of 2013 five academics from different UK universities 
published a paper on the prospects for renewable energy in the context of the 
debate about Scottish independence (Toke et al 2013). The conclusion was that 
it would likely be rather more expensive to reach the Scottish Government’s 
renewable energy targets in the case of an independent Scotland as opposed 
to Scotland remaining within the Union.  Since the paper was published, 
there have been significant developments in UK electricity policy, and as a 
result we now wish to adjust our conclusions with respect to the prospects for 
renewables in the case of Scottish independence, or ‘devo plus’ circumstances, 
where Scotland has an independently managed and financed electricity system. 
In short, we now suggest that with a UK nuclear new build programme going 
ahead, an independent Scottish electricity system could deliver the Scottish 
renewable electricity target at lower electricity prices for the consumer than 
if this was achieved as part of the continued union of the electricity system 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK. 
Two new factors are radically changing the context of our earlier analysis. 
On October 21st the UK Government announced a ‘deal’ for a new twin 
nuclear reactor at Hinkley C, and possibly a second twin reactor at Sizewell C. 
Further nuclear plant are also planned. This will significantly increase prices 
for UK electricity consumers that would not have to be paid by consumers 
in an independent Scottish electricity system.  Second, in June 2013 the UK 
Government announced incentive levels and terms for renewable energy 
from 2017/18 as part of Electricity Market Reform (EMR) (DECC 2013). These 
incentive levels seem unlikely to support major deployment of Scottish offshore 
renewable resources. The incentives for offshore wind and also tidal stream 
and wave power payable from 2018 under Electricity Market Reform (EMR) 
have been significantly reduced compared to the incentives available under the 
Renewables Obligation (RO), something that is critical for offshore wind schemes 
in deeper waters. Unlike nuclear power, loan guarantees are not available for 
innovative marine renewable technologies like tidal stream and wave power. The 
EMR settlement means that there is now unlikely to be major offshore Scottish 
renewable development after 2017. This reduces the argument in favour of 
Scotland remaining in a UK-wide electricity system. An (offshore renewable) 
programme which does not exist cannot be cheaper for Scottish consumers in a 
UK wide electricity system as opposed to a Scottish system. 
We have used this changing context to look again at the costs of achieving 
Scottish renewable electricity targets under an independent Scottish system 
compared to a UK-wide electricity system. We believe that given the progress 
that is already being made towards meeting the Scottish renewable energy 
target (of 100 per cent of Scottish electricity consumption derived from 
renewable energy by 2020), achievement of the target can be extensively 
based on further development of onshore wind and other sources including 
hydro, solar pv and sustainable biomass.  Increases in Scottish energy prices 
to fund this will be less than remaining in a UK-wide electricity system in 
which Scottish consumers would have to fund both renewable energy and the 
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UK Government’s projected nuclear power construction programme. In an 
independent Scottish system the Scottish Government could use its discretion 
to fund some offshore renewable whilst restricting price increases to less than 
may be the case in a UK-wide system.
For the purposes of this analysis we assume current technology costs of 
renewable energy in the shape of onshore wind and nuclear power in the 
form of Hinkley C nuclear power station. The prices are based on the levels 
set by the Government, with the proviso that renewables receive equivalent 
terms to that of nuclear power, as explained below. We calculate that, in the 
case of continued union of Scottish and electricity systems in England and 
Wales, the combined increase of prices to domestic electricity consumers of 
new nuclear build and that of reaching the Scottish Government’s renewable 
electricity target would range from 5.6 per cent in the case of just the Hinkley C 
construction, 8.0 per cent if both Hinkley C and Sizewell C is built, and 10.4 per 
cent in the case of construction of a third twin reactor set. 
By contrast we calculate that achievement of the Scottish Government’s 
renewable energy target, in the context of an independent Scottish electricity 
system, would increase Scottish electricity consumer bills by 7.2 per cent. 
However, such a (Scottish) price increase would last for a much shorter period 
(than in England and Wales) as 35 year premium price contracts are being 
awarded for nuclear power and, in our analysis, 20 years for renewables. In this 
case it is very possible that further steep declines in the cost of technologies 
such as solar pv could reduce prices before the end of the period in which 
consumers were paying off the incentives for nuclear power.
Our calculations include the assumption that under an independent system the 
Scottish Government could reduce the annual charge to electricity consumers 
of delivering renewable energy by a) offering 20 year contracts to renewable 
energy generators rather than ones lasting just 15 years under EMR, b) by 
offering the renewable energy schemes loan guarantees (as is being done with 
Hinkley C), and also c) by extending  ‘feed-in tariff’ contracts  to independent 
generators, not just major electricity companies as is the case under EMR. 
Under an independent Scottish electricity system a Scottish Government could 
also offer increased incentives and loan guarantees to promote significant 
development of Scottish offshore renewables, something that seems unlikely 
to occur under EMR. This would either involve price increases over 7.2 per 
cent or restricting the Scottish renewable target to, say, 90 per cent of Scottish 
electricity consumption. An independent Scottish electricity system could also 
be designed to suit renewable electricity rather than conventional centralised 
power generation, such as ending the priority to Feed-in Tariffs given to the 
big energy companies over independent generators. This would also help the 
growing community renewable energy sector. 
We therefore conclude that we need to heavily qualify our previous conclusion 
that it would necessarily be much more expensive to reach the Scottish 
Government’s renewable energy targets under the establishment of an 
independent Scottish electricity system. Indeed in the context of EMR and the 
possibility of extending the nuclear programme beyond Hinkley C, from the 
mid-2020s onwards, it is likely to be cheaper for Scotland’s renewable energy 
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INTRODUCTION 
The announcement, on October 21st, that the UK Government had concluded a 
deal with EDF and partner companies1 (hereafter referred to as ‘EDF etc’) has a 
number of implications for UK energy policy, some of which are hotly debated. 
The ‘deal’, which still requires consent of the EU Commission under EU state-
aid rules, involves EDF etc being given the option of developing Hinkley C 
nuclear power scheme with premium prices lasting 35 years from the point 
of plant commissioning. The premium price will be £92.50 MWh. In recent 
times wholesale electricity prices have been in the region of £50 per MWh. 
The Government also hopes that more nuclear power will be built by 2030. If a 
further two sets of reactors are built this there will be a total of 9.6 GWe of ‘new 
build’ nuclear power in operation by 2030. 
Much of the debate about the ‘Hinkley C’ Government decision has been either 
about the price agreed, the length of the contract, the offer of loan guarantees, 
or the involvement of Chinese companies in owning the plant. However, there 
has been much less discussion of the implications of this decision for Scottish 
electricity and renewable energy policy in the context of the Independence 
Referendum in September 2014. 
This lack of discussion is strange, if you consider the recent controversies 
around increases in domestic energy bills and the centrality of energy issues 
to debates over Scottish Independence. Indeed the Scottish Government 
has been explicit in its opposition to granting planning permission for nuclear 
power plant on Scottish soil, and it has also adopted ambitious targets to supply 
the equivalent of 100 per cent of electricity consumption in Scotland from 
renewable energy by 2020.
Two factors perhaps explain the lack of debate. First, energy is a very complex 
business, with the ramifications of policies poorly understood by the general 
public, especially in this case with the added complication of the relationship 
between electricity in Scotland to renewable energy programmes organised 
through Westminster. A second factor is that the Westminster Government has 
recently focussed  public attention on the impact of support for renewable on  
energy prices, rather than  impact of the new nuclear power programme, which 
will not start operating before 2023. The new nuclear programme is also likely 
to increase consumer electricity prices, although this would not be the case in  
Scotland if its electricity system was independent from the rest of Britain.
1  HM Government (2013) Initial agreement reached on new nuclear power station at Hinkley Press 
Release, 21/10/13,  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/initial-agreement-reached-on-new-
nuclear-power-station-at-hinkley
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We, the authors of a study on ‘Delivering Renewable Energy Under Devolution’ 
(DREUD), have already commented on the potential impact of Scottish 
independence on renewable energy ambitions (Toke et al 2013). However, 
this study was completed prior to the recent deal over nuclear power stations. 
Indeed, we assumed that agreements such as that announced for Hinkley C 
would be economically implausible. Moreover, since we published our original 
research, the Government has also announced its incentives for renewable 
energy under Electricity Market Reform (EMR) which appear to be significantly 
less supportive of renewable energy compared to the arrangements associated 
with the Renewables Obligation (RO) (DECC 2013). These developments 
substantially impact on our previous conclusions, so we now feel an 
imperative to highlight its implications for the future management of the 
Scottish renewable programme and indeed, for the wider debate on Scottish 
Independence. 
We previously argued that, relative to remaining with the Union, Scottish 
Independence could substantially increase the cost to Scottish consumers of 
achieving its renewable energy targets. However, having reviewed the impact 
of the Government’s recent decisions on nuclear power and incentives for 
renewables, we believe that this is no longer the case. Moreover, the notion of 
Scotland having its own renewable energy support mechanism (and indeed its 
own electricity market arrangements) is no longer necessarily detrimental to the 
prospect of renewable energy in the long term. On the contrary, on the basis 
of the evidence considered here, we believe that Scotland’s renewable energy 
programme would now benefit from having an independent electricity system 
and support arrangements for supporting non-fossil electricity sources.
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OUR MODEL
Our model compares the costs to the consumer of meeting the Scottish 
Government’s renewable electricity target under four different scenarios. Our 
projections are conservative in the sense that we assume current technology 
costs for nuclear power and renewables, as evidenced in the price and terms 
of the Hinkley C ’deal’ and incentives offered by the Government for onshore 
wind. We note that the Government has assumed that the price of successive 
nuclear power plant will fall (with the price being reduced from £92.50 MWh 
to £89.50 if Sizewell C is built), which we regard as being at least, if not more, 
speculative than assuming the cost of renewables will also fall. Indeed there 
are good arguments that the costs of wind and solar energy are more likely 
to fall than nuclear power. Nevertheless we use the headline premium prices 
announced by the Government for onshore wind power from 2017 and for 
Hinkley C as the bases of our analysis for all future nuclear and onshore wind 
plant. The only caveat to this is the assumption that onshore wind power 
projects will receive equivalent terms and conditions to nuclear power through 
access to loan guarantees and longer premium price contracts, and the 
‘headline’ prices are re-calculated to give effect to this reasoning. 
We fully appreciate that other very viable renewable energy technologies 
exist, but for the sake of clarity we have focussed on comparing just two 
technologies; wind and nuclear. We discuss this issue in some further detail 
later. We also simplify the calculation by assuming that wholesale electricity 
prices will remain at the same level as in recent times, £50 per MWh. 
Government projections indicate a big increase in real wholesale electricity 
prices over the coming years, a speculation that is open to question. However, 
even though wholesale electricity prices may well change (upwards or 
downwards), the relative costs of the renewable and nuclear programmes 
under the different scenarios are likely to remain the same and the conclusions 
about comparative costs of delivering renewable programmes under different 
scenarios will not be fundamentally altered.  Calculations that are based on the 
assumptions made here are reproduced in the Appendix of this report.
To illustrate our argument we have developed four scenarios, based on the 
following; 
 • Scenario 1: construction of  just two reactors at Hinkley C, by around  
  2023, and continued investment in renewable energy in the UK;
 • Scenario 2: 4 nuclear reactors  by 2030, and continued investment in  
  renewable energy in the UK;
 • Scenario 3: Six nuclear reactors by 2030. It should be noted that the  
  projection of six nuclear reactors by 2030 is still less than the HM   
  Government project to be built by 2030 (HM Government 2013).  
  Again, continued investment in renewable energy in the UK is achieved;
 • Scenario 4: an independent Scottish electricity system. Under this   
  scenario Scottish consumers would not pay any premiums for new   
  nuclear power stations but they would pay premiums necessary to fulfil  
  Scotland’s 100 per cent renewable target after 2017. It is assumed that  
  the Scottish renewable energy target of 100 per cent of electricity   
  consumption from renewable energy would be achieved by around 2023.
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The price increases apply to all of British electricity consumers under scenarios 
1, 2 and 3, but in Scenario 4 has its own electricity trading arrangements. This 
would apply in the circumstance that Scotland developed its own electricity 
market and renewable energy support system. Such an arrangement would 
still allow electricity to be traded between Scotland and the UK, but Scotland 
and England/Wales could have separate support mechanisms for non-fossil 
energy sources and a separate regulatory system. Such arrangements could 
apply under both Scottish Independence or in the case of any ‘devo-plus’ 
settlement which included indigenous control over Scottish electricity market 
arrangements. A Scottish Ofgem would need to exist and agreements over 
cross border energy trading would have to be developed under ‘devo plus’. In 
some ways full independence would require fewer new decisions to be made 
as cross border electricity trading would simply be regulated by EU network 
codes, as discussed below.
Under Scenario 4:
 • Scottish electricity consumers would be responsible for paying the  
  full cost of premium price contracts for renewable energy installed after  
  an agreed post-referendum ‘market separation’ date. The date would  
  have to be negotiated according to the practicalities of achieving market  
  separation, which may be in the context of either independence or a  
  new ‘devo-plus’ arrangement. If, following a public consultation,   
  legislation was brought forward in 2016, then new market arrangements  
  could at least begin to take effect in 2018.
 • Renewable energy installations commissioned (and also those subject  
  to contract) prior to the agreed date for market separation would   
  continue to be funded by ‘pooled’ arrangements under the Renewables  
  Obligation (RO) and a transitional arrangement to cover the introduction  
  of Electricity Market Reform (due to be phased in from 2014-2017).
 • Under conditions of market separation the Scottish Government would  
  be free to create conditions to underpin, and terms that suit, the   
  development of a Scottish electricity system based on renewable  
  energy. Currently the British system is underpinned by arrangements  
  that do not suit funding and management of renewable energy. 
 • The Scottish electricity system would be managed separately to that  
  of England and Wales. This was the case until 2005, whereafter the  
  British Electricity Transmission and Trading Arrangement (BETTA)  
  was established. A system could be established similar to the   
  NORDPOOL system covering Scandinavia. Under this system   
  there is a common electricity trading network whereby electricity  
  is traded at the prevailing wholesale prices between the different  
  networks. However the different countries maintain differing   
  regulatory regimes within their national zones, in particular relating  
  to premium prices paid to different renewable energy technologies  
  (i.e. payments that differ from the wholesale electricity price). Such  
  premium prices are payable only to schemes installed within the   
  different countries, although renewable energy support schemes can be  
  common between countries by agreement (in particular between  
  Norway and Sweden).  It should be noted that under EU internal   
  market rules the rest of the UK would have to trade equitably with  
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  Scottish generators and suppliers on the basis of wholesale electricity  
  prices. There are precise rules, and indeed an agreed price, governing  
  inter-state electricity trading, the agreed transmission price for traded  
  electricity being pegged at a low level so that inter-state trading can  
  be encouraged (ENTSO-E 2013). An independent Scottish system  
  would be responsible for regulating transmission upgrades. However, a  
  lot of planned transmission upgrades will be completed or under   
  construction by 2018, and the costs of future interconnectors between  
  Scotland and the South may be shared between Scotland and (the rest  
  of) the UK.
 • Scottish electricity consumers would not be liable to pay premium prices  
  to support new nuclear power. On the other hand it would mean that  
  Scottish electricity consumers would have to bear the sole burden of  
  paying premiums necessary to support Scottish renewable energy  
  installed after the market separation date. However, as mentioned  
  earlier (and discussed more later), the fact that this would be offset by 
   avoiding having to pay for new nuclear power could allow a substantial  
  expansion of Scottish renewable energy to continue without paying  
  extra costs.
 • Separate regulation of the renewable energy support mechanism  
  would allow a feed-in tariff system to be established that allows   
  independent and community based renewable energy schemes to  
  have direct access to the feed-in tariff. This is the case under the   
  German feed-in tariff system. Under the current EMR arrangements  
  only very large electricity companies have access to the feed-in   
  tariff contracts (‘contracts for difference’ – CfDs). This would allow  
  higher income for, and more projects from, the independent generators 
  and less unearned income for the major electricity companies that ought  
  to go directly to the renewable energy generators (Toke 2012).
 • Regulations more suited to managing a system based on renewable  
  energy could be introduced compared to the regulations under BETTA.  
  Since the ‘New Electricity Trading Arrangement’ (NETA) was   
  introduced in 2001 trading on wholesale electricity markets has   
  been effectively limited to major electricity companies owing to   
  regulations demanding high levels of guaranteed liquidity to pay   
  ‘imbalance charges’ - potentially high penalties for failing to deliver  
  electricity promised by generators. However this system was introduced  
  to ensure that conventional ‘centralised despatch’ power plant delivered  
  expected outputs, in the context of issues associated with the operation  
  of conventional fossil fuel power stations.  Such a regulation is   
  unnecessary and counterproductive for variable, decentralised,    
  generation. A separate system regulated by Scotland could end   
  the need for renewable energy generators to face penalties for failure  
  to supply. This could enable even small renewable energy generators to  
  trade on wholesale electricity markets. There are different options for  
  managing balancing of renewables. The task can be assigned to  
  the System Operator. The renewable generators could also be  
  incentivised to contract for their own balancing arrangements, as is  
  being done in Germany.    
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 • We assume that under market separation (ie. under independence, or  
  by agreement under ‘devo plus’ market separation) the Scottish   
  Government would have at its disposal the ability to give loan   
  guarantees for non-fossil energy purposes similar to that being offered  
  to Hinkley C  to renewable energy. Indeed, we suggest that around £4.9  
  billion2 would be required to give around 65 per cent loan guarantees  
  to the renewables programme, discussed in this document for Scotland,  
  which would be necessary to complete the Scottish Government’s  
  100 per cent renewable energy target. We estimate that this will reduce  
  the required internal rate of return (IRR) for onshore wind power  
  schemes by around 2 per cent and lead to significant reductions in the  
  premium price necessary to deliver a given capacity of wind power. We  
  base this on analyses such as that conducted by Earthtrack (1995) on  
  impacts of government underwriting in general on required rates of  
  return and on the discussion of how investment conditions affect  
  onshore wind power financing in Mazar (2013). See the Appendix for  
  a cost breakdown. It should be noted that £10 billion worth of loan  
  guarantees are being offered for development of Hinkley C. This implies  
  that something of the order of £30 billion of loan guarantees would have  
  to be offered by the UK Government to finance three twin reactors.
 • We assume that under market separation the Scottish Government  
  would be able to issue ‘feed-in tariff’ contracts with longer contract  
  lengths than is the case under EMR, for example 20 years as opposed  
  to 15 under EMR.  This produces a reduced level of premium prices  
  payable to renewable energy schemes. See Appendix for a cost   
  breakdown.
 • Based on data concerning renewable energy that is in operation,   
  is under construction or has been consented and is likely to be built  
  (RenewableUK 2013 - UKWED, UK Government 2013, plus media  
  reports on specific project consents), we calculate that by 2018,   
  sufficient renewable energy generation will be installed to achieve  
  around 67 per cent of the Scottish renewable electricity target .  We  
  calculate that around 25.3 TWh is likely to be generated in 2018   
  compared to Scottish electricity consumption (in 2011) of 37.9 TWh  
  (Scottish Government 2013a, 25). See the Appendix for further   
  discussion.
 2  Assuming capital costs of £1400 per KW (Milborrow 2013)
The DREUD Report - By David Toke, Peter Strachan, Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, and Fionnguala Sherry-Brennan.
13
MODEL OUTPUTS 
Our projections indicate that:
1. The price increase for the Scottish consumer of having Hinkley C and 
achieving the Scottish Government’s renewable energy target in the 
context of a unified UK electricity market (under EMR) would be 5.6 per 
cent in the case of Hinkley C being built, but this would rise to 8.0 per 
cent if Sizewell C was also built and 10.4 per cent if a third twin reactor 
was built. Indeed these price increases would apply to all UK electricity 
consumers outside of Northern Ireland. The bulk of these price rises would 
persist for 35 years after 2023.
2. Under an independent Scottish electricity system, a consumer price 
increase of 7.2 per cent would be required to meet the Scottish 
Government’s renewable electricity target, with price increases lasting for 
20 years from around 2020-23.
DISCUSSION
One objection to Scenario 4 might be the amount of extra onshore wind 
required to meet the Scottish renewable target – some 5.4 GWe. Yet we argue 
that our analysis is still plausible considering that:
 • Currently there is around 7.6 GWe of onshore wind power in Scotland  
  that is either operational, under construction or which has been given  
  planning consent. There is already a considerable quantity of onshore  
  wind power awaiting planning decisions to increase this capacity. In the  
  summer of 2013 (the most recent data available to us) this amounted to  
  almost 4 GWe of onshore wind projects (Scottish Government 2013b).
 • The quantities of sites that could be used for wind power could be  
  considerably enhanced if solutions that are now available to solve radar  
  interference are applied in areas currently ruled out for wind   
  development by aviation objections
 • The 5.4 GWe figure is at the top end of requirements for onshore  
  wind power to meet the target since other forms of renewable energy  
  can be deployed to help meet the Scottish renewable energy targets.  
  These include solar, hydro and sustainable biomass sources. Despite  
  impressions that exist to the contrary, solar resources (per square metre)  
  in Scotland are little different to the rest of the UK and solar pv prices  
  have declined dramatically in recent years meaning that installation  
  rates are likely to pick up in the years ahead.
It is a matter of debate about what the most suitable premium price contract 
length for renewable energy schemes may be. Differing technologies may 
have a need for different lengths; certainly offshore renewables (especially 
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tidal stream and wave) could do with longer rather than shorter contract 
lengths. However  the granting of such a long term contract for nuclear power 
(35 years), as recently announced by the UK Government, distorts the price 
comparison with renewables if such comparisons are made solely by comparing 
the ‘headline cost’ rather than taking into account the impact on consumer 
costs of a longer contract (as well as loan guarantees) for nuclear compared 
to renewables. Certainly, from this point of view, our decision to use 20 years 
as the contract length basis for renewables  is justified in order to give a more 
realistic assessment of the comparisons of costs to the consumer between 
nuclear and renewable energy programmes. Claims by the Government that 
nuclear power deserves such longer contracts compared to onshore wind 
(allegedly because nuclear stations will last 60 years whilst onshore wind 
cannot generate for longer than 25 years) may be challenged on the basis of 
the historical record. The oldest nuclear power plant still operating is no more 
than 45 years old whereas there are commercial wind turbines in California still 
operating after 30 years.
Although Scotland gives a high priority to development of marine renewable 
resources, we have chosen not to include the costs of this in our analysis. It 
has been noted that Scotland could not afford to develop large quantities of 
marine resources if it was outside the UK. Indeed in our previous paper (Toke 
et al 2013), this point formed an important part of our argument about the 
relative affordability of an offshore programme being funded by the UK rather 
than Scottish consumers on their own. However, recent announcements on the 
funding of new nuclear power plants using controversial terms and  the EMR 
incentives and terms, are not encouraging for offshore renewables after 2018. 
Therefore the argument that Scotland will depend on the wider UK to support 
its offshore programme does not apply if there is little possibility of more than 
very small quantities of marine renewable emerging through EMR. The headline 
price for offshore wind from 2018 was set at £135 per MWh (in June 2013) 
which sounds comparable to that on offer under the Renewables Obligation 
(RO), except that the length of the contract for all renewable schemes was cut 
by 25 per cent and there is less allowance for inflation adjustment of price. In 
addition no loan guarantees will be available for the capital costs of the offshore 
renewable projects themselves. There is unlikely to be much offshore wind built 
on such terms after 2018, especially in Scotland where the proposed schemes 
tend to be in the deeper, more expensive, waters and sites. The Scottish 
Government has keenly supported tidal steam and wave developments in the 
Pentland Firth. Yet despite the apparently high strike prices offered to wave 
and tidal under the EMR settlement, very little of this capacity is likely to be 
developed with just 15 year contracts and also without loan guarantees being 
offered for the projects themselves. These innovative technologies may be 
regarded by banks as involving uncertainties. Loan guarantees, it seems, are 
being reserved for nuclear power rather than marine renewables. 
Under EMR the Scottish Government loses all control over consumer financed 
renewable energy incentives after 2017. However, a Scottish Government that 
does control financial incentives for energy may choose to trade-off support for 
onshore renewable with additional funding for offshore renewable projects. Of 
course, the more offshore renewables capacity is funded then either the price 
for Scottish electricity consumers will rise above the level indicated here, or the 
Scottish renewable energy target may not be achieved by 2023.
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Another issue is the impact of the ability of an independent Scottish electricity 
system to meet electricity demands without increased danger of blackouts for 
consumers, which is one of the key justifications for investing in nuclear. We 
can see no persuasive argument that an independent Scottish system would 
have greater insecurity. As is the case with the UK system, increased use of 
renewable energy implies the usefulness of having some sort of ‘capacity 
mechanism’ whereby the System Operator ensures, through regular auctions 
for capacity in different conditions, that there is sufficient power station capacity 
available to meet demand. The adoption of such a system is a key part of EMR. 
One study suggested that an independent electricity system in Scotland would 
have a peak demand of 7.3 GWe (University of Edinburgh 2006). Even if we 
discount completely the value of variable renewable energy supplies towards 
meeting peak demand (although on probability grounds this variable generation 
will still have some ‘firm demand’ value), Scotland should need no more than 
around 5 GWe of new fossil fuel reserve capacity. This assumes the retirement 
of Torness and Hunterston B nuclear power stations by 2030 and other existing 
fossil fuel power plant (unless converted to CCS or to run on biomass). 
Assuming a modest growth in hydro and biomass renewable capacity around  
3 GWe of firm capacity should be available from these sources. In addition to 
this ‘demand shifting’ techniques are being developed that will reduce the level 
of peak electricity demand. The remaining balance of fossil fuel reserve would 
most likely be combined cycle gas power stations (CCGTs) such as the planned 
1000 MW plant at Cockenzie, or CCS power plant such as the 400 MWe plant 
planned for Grangemouth. However, given the existence of the EU’s internal 
electricity market, which has strict rules which defend the rights of all market 
actors to engage in competitive electricity trading, such CCGTs would not need 
to be sited in Scotland itself. A  Scottish capacity mechanism could contract 
with CCGTs in England and Wales, and also the UK capacity mechanism 
could contract with Scottish based power plant to supply capacity for the UK 
electricity system.  A capacity mechanism will add to the costs of the system 
(much as there were capacity payments in the system in the 1990s), but there 
is no clear reason to suggest that capacity charges will be significantly higher 
in Scotland compared to England. It may be argued that the greater reliance 
on variable renewable energy supplies may make the Scottish system more 
expensive to manage, but set against this is the fact that the UK will be reliant 
on inflexible nuclear generation which restricts the efficiency of the system to 
respond to demand variations. It is beyond the scope of this study to model 
different combinations of non-renewable power plant capacity and operation. 
What is apparent, however, is that Scotland will continue to be a net electricity 
exporter to the South. 
We have assumed current electricity consumption and recent wholesale 
electricity prices when making the calculations in this report. Although it is the 
case that electricity consumption may rise in the next few years, it is also the 
case that electricity consumption in the UK has actually fallen by 7 per cent in 
the period 2007-2012. We do not speculate about future wholesale electricity 
prices. We note Government projections of massive price increases over the 
next 15-20 years. As we commented in our introduction, such scenarios are 
treated with scepticism by many, and anyway under such circumstances, an 
independent Scottish electricity system would still deliver a cheaper outcome 
for Scottish consumers compared to a continued UK-wide electricity system. 




The conclusion of this report therefore qualifies our previous conclusion that it 
would necessarily be much more expensive to reach the Scottish Government’s 
renewable energy targets under the establishment (or, to be precise, re-
establishment) of an independent Scottish electricity system. Indeed, if the 
UK’s new nuclear build does extend beyond Hinkley C, from the mid-2020s 
onwards it will be clearly cheaper for Scotland’s renewable energy targets to be 
met in the context of an independent electricity supply system rather than in a 
‘socialised’ UK system. This change in our analysis is driven by two new factors. 
First, because of the combined impact of the increased cost to consumers that 
will occur because of the proposed deal over Hinkley C, Sizewell C and possibly 
other reactors which Scottish consumers would not have to bear in the case 
of an independent Scottish electricity system. Second this is because of the 
Electricity Market Reform incentives levels announced in June 2013, which are 
unlikely to support significant deployment of offshore renewable resources in 
Scotland. A key point of our earlier argument was that the Scottish consumers 
were unlikely, in political terms, to bear the costs of nearly as much deployment 
of offshore renewable energy capacity compared to what could be afforded on 
a united UK-wide basis. However, the point about the EMR settlement is that 
there is unlikely to be much Scottish offshore renewable development anyway 
after 2017. In short, a programme which does not exist cannot be cheaper 
than another programme which may not exist! Certainly, an independently run 
Scottish system could decide to pay higher charges in order to support at least 
some offshore renewable development in Scottish waters, acknowledging that 
doing so may constrain the amount that may be deployable at acceptable cost. 
Such discretionary power is part of the attraction of having an independent 
Scottish electricity system. However, it flows from the foregoing analysis that 
if the UK as a whole is willing to entertain over a 10 per cent increase in prices 
in the context of a new nuclear capacity, then it would clearly be feasible, at 
the same cost, for Scotland to both fulfil its 100 per cent renewable energy 
electricity target and also deploy some offshore renewable schemes as a 
contribution to this target. 
The policy mechanisms that could be deployed by an independent Scottish 
action seem to us to allow a rather more cost-effective mode of delivery of 
renewable energy compared to that ensconced within EMR. An independent 
Scottish programme could issue longer term contracts for renewable energy 
schemes compared to what will be the case under EMR, it could offer loan 
guarantees to renewable energy projects comparable to those being offered 
to new nuclear build, and it could also issue feed-in tariff contracts that could 
be accessed by independent generators, including an expanding community 
renewables sector. Indeed the very architecture of the trading rules governing 
an independent Scottish electricity system could be fashioned to reflect a 
system based on renewable energy, as opposed to the architecture of the UK 
system which makes trading on electricity markets well nigh impossible for 
independent energy generators.  
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APPENDIX - ASSUMPTIONS AND CALCULATIONS 
 
All costs based on 2013 prices. We assume that the ‘strike prices’ paid to 
generators for technologies such as nuclear power and onshore wind remain 
constant at the levels announced by the Government to take effect from 2017/8 
onwards.
UK and Scottish electricity generation and consumption
Consumption was 326 TWh in 2011 for UK, 32.1 TWh for Scotland. Generation 
figures are higher to reflect losses in activities such as electricity distribution, 
and also, in the case of Scotland, there are electricity exports to the South. In 
the UK electricity generation was 368 TWh and Scotland generated 52TWh 
(UK Government 2012, p 54-56). The figure for Scottish electricity consumption 
used to calculate the Scottish renewable target is 37.9 TWh, this being a ‘gross’ 
consumption figure (Scottish Government 2013a, 25). 
Assuming average GB domestic electricity bills of £500 per year and average 
electricity consumption of 4200 KWh per year, as calculated by a November 
2013 House of Commons Report (Bolton 2013, 6-7), the average electricity 
price was around 12p/KWh in 2012. 
 
A capacity factor of 26.7 per cent was assumed for wind power in Scotland (UK 
Government, 2013, 57).
Scottish renewable energy generation was 14.8 TWh in 2012 (UK Government 
2013, 51). Based on analysis of the data for wind power capacity that is 
installed, under construction and consented  according to the UKWED 
database (RenewableUK 2013), we estimate that (using a conservative 
estimate) an additional 9.2 TWh of annual Scottish wind production will be in 
place by  2018. This increase includes generation from capacity installed during 
2013.  In addition to this there will be additions of generation from biomass, 
hydro and solar pv which may add a further 1.3 TWh of generation, leading 
to Scottish renewable energy production of around 25.3 TWh in 2018. This is 
around 67 per cent of the Scottish renewable energy target for 2020.
Nuclear power
Building nuclear power at Hinkley C and Sizewell C would comprise a total 
generating capacity of 6.4 GWe operating at 90 per cent generating capacity 
producing 50 TWh a year, around 14 per cent of UK electricity generation. 
We assume that a third set of a twin reactor would cost a similar amount as the 
previous sets, meaning total new nuclear capacity of 9.6 GWe, 76 TWh a year 
or around 21 per cent of UK electricity generation.
Cost to UK consumers of nuclear power
Assumptions: wholesale electricity price £50 per MWh (approximate average 
for 2010-2013 period), the Government’s announced ‘strike price’ of £92.50 
for Hinkley C and  £92.50 per MWh for both Hinkley C and Sizewell C, all 
for 35 year contracts with 65 per cent investment covered by Treasury loan 
guarantees. We assume that the price for an additional two reactors would also 
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be £92.50 with similar other terms. The price increase for 2 reactors (Hinkley 
C) would be 2.4 per cent, or £10 a year for the average Scottish consumer. This 
increase would last for 35 years. The price increase for 4 reactors would be 4.8 
per cent for domestic electricity consumers by 2030, with price increases lasting 
for 35 years. In the case of six reactors there would be a price increase of 7.2 
per cent for Scottish electricity consumers.
Renewable energy costs under EMR
The declared incentive for onshore wind power to be paid under EMR from 
2017 is £95 per MWh for a 15 year contract, no loan guarantees, with the feed-
in tariff contracts only made directly available to major electricity companies. 
In order to try to the UK’s EU target for renewable energy deployment (and 
whatever target replaces the target after 2020), the UK would have to fund 
renewables both north and south of the Scottish border. Moreover this would 
be funded using, as discussed, a much more expensive system compared to 
our projected system of Scottish feed-in tariffs with loan guarantees and 20 year 
contracts and direct access for contracts for independent generators.  
If we assume, on the basis of recent past experience, that around 40 per cent 
of the renewables funded under EMR were deployed in Scotland, and 60 per 
cent in the rest of the UK then we need to calculate the cost to the consumer 
of installing the 5.4 GWe of renewable energy (in terms of capacity outputs 
equivalent to onshore wind) to be installed in Scotland to meet their target (as 
discussed in the next section) and around 8.1 GWe installed in the rest of the 
UK. Thus keeping the 40:60 ration of deployment discussed. This would take 
the UK towards (although still short) of the 30 per cent of electricity sourced 
from renewable energy often associated with achieving the EU target of 15 
per cent of all UK energy being derived from renewable by 2020. At £95 per 
MWh this works out at an increase of around 3.2 per cent in UK consumer 
electricity prices.  In other words, the cost to Scottish electricity consumers as 
well as consumers in the rest of the UK in order to meet the Scottish renewable 
electricity target would be 3.2 per cent. As we argue elsewhere in this paper, 
an additional 5.4 GWe of onshore wind (or at least its equivalent in other 
renewable technologies) is not implausible in Scotland, at least by around 
2023. In the case of the UK, a large proportion of the projected 8.1 GWe of 
onshore wind (or equivalent capacity in other renewable technologies) would 
certainly have to come from technologies other than onshore wind.  Resources 
of onshore wind will still exist, perhaps more in Northern Ireland and Wales and 
the Republic of Ireland rather than England. However other renewable energy 
resources maybe mobilised for the much the same costs as onshore wind in the 
future. This includes dedicated biomass plants, more biomass conversion of 
existing power plant and, again, as mentioned earlier, the possibility that solar 
pv will achieve increasing penetrations at costs no more than £100 per MWh, or 
for less as the 2020s roll on. 
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Increases in electricity prices for Scottish consumer of meeting renewable target 
and nuclear power under a united UK electricity system.
As indicated earlier the consumer price increase for two reactors would be 2.4 
per cent, 4.8 per cent for 4 reactors and the cost of six reactors would thus 
be 7.2 per cent.  Adding together the costs of paying for both nuclear power 
and the UK renewable energy programme, the minimum price increases for 
consumers in both Scotland and the rest of the UK in a unified UK electricity 
market that would be associated with achieving the Scottish renewable 
electricity target together with the nuclear programme would be 5.6 per cent in 
the case of Hinkley C being built, but this would rise to 8.0 per cent if Sizewell C 
was also built and 10.4 per cent if a third twin reactor was built.
Renewable Energy costs under an independent Scottish 
electricity system
5.4 GW of wind power operating at 26.7 per cent capacity factor will 
generate around 12.6  TWh of electricity which is around 33 per cent of 
Scottish electricity consumption calculated for the purposes of the Scottish 
Government’s 100 per cent renewable electricity target. As can be seen in 
a recent analysis of investment costs of onshore wind in the UK longer loan 
repayment schedules, lower lending margins and higher debt to equity 
ratios would significantly increase the economic viability of windfarms. 
Loan guarantees offered by the Scottish Government could help achieve 
these objectives. It is assumed that loan guarantees offered by the Scottish 
Government will reduce the required internal rate of return by around 2 per 
cent than would otherwise be the case. An additional factor reducing wind 
power costs under a Scottish feed-in tariff would be if they can be awarded, 
as in Germany, directly to independent renewable energy generators rather 
than just major electricity companies as is an effect of EMR. This will improve 
the opportunities for independent generators to make economically viable 
projects. Below is an estimated comparison of economically viable payments to 
windfarms under different terms.
With 15 year contract and no loan guarantees: £95 per MWh to be paid by UK 
Government under EMR from 2017. We calculate, using discounted cashflow 
analysis that this will give equivalent returns to equity under the following 
terms:
With 20 year contract and no loan guarantees: £87 per MWh
With 20 year contract and loan guarantees to cover 65 per cent of capital costs 
(a similar proportion to that being offered to Hinkley C): £76 per MWh
We use this £76 per MWh as our assumed cost of onshore wind when we 
calculate the costs of meeting the Scottish Government’s renewable energy 
target in the context of an independent Scottish electricity system.
Increases in Price for Scottish consumer under an independent Scottish 
electricity system
Under an independent Scottish electricity system costs to consumer of wind 
power at £76 per MWh would be 7.2 per cent price increase with price 
increases lasting for 20 years from around 2020-2023
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